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T
he 2007–08 international food price crisis caused hardship 
on a number of fronts. The steep rise in food prices led to 
economic difficulties for the poor and generated political tur-
moil in many countries. The crisis could also result in long-term, 
irreversible nutritional damage, especially among children. There is 
a global interest in preventing such events from recurring.
The price crisis was triggered by a complex set of long-term 
and short-term factors, including policy failures and market 
overreactions. One important factor in the crisis was the entry 
of significant financial resources into futures markets, including 
food commodity markets, which contributed to a price spike dur-
ing the first six months of 2008. This episode highlights the need 
to modify the architecture of international financial and agricul-
tural markets to address the problem of price spikes, especially 
their effects on the livelihoods of the poor.
Although a set of guiding principles for regulating agricul-
tural and commodity futures markets should be developed and 
recent inappropriate trade policy instruments such as export 
bans should be reviewed, these actions are not sufficient to 
avoid extreme price spikes and to ensure that the world can re-
spond to emergency needs for food. We propose two global col-
lective actions to meet these goals. First, a small physical food 
reserve should be established to facilitate a smooth response to 
food emergencies. Second, an innovative virtual reserve should 
be set up to help prevent market price spikes and to keep prices 
closer to levels suggested by long-run market fundamentals 
like supply and demand. This brief offers some specifics on 
implementing a proposal described in our earlier IFPRI policy 
brief titled Physical and Virtual Global Food Reserves to Protect 
the Poor and Prevent Market Failure (June 2008).
Price instability is a general feature of agricultural markets. 
The proposals made here are designed not to stabilize prices 
generally, but to prevent damaging price spikes. The proposed 
actions will entail costs, but the modest costs of the required 
organizational elements must be balanced against the benefits 
of more effective international financial architecture. These 
benefits will include prevention of economic hardship, improved 
market efficiency, stronger incentives for long-term investment 
in agriculture, and prevention of political instability.
The Role of Speculation in the Price Spike
Changes in supply and demand fundamentals cannot fully explain 
the recent drastic increase in food prices. Rising expectations, 
hoarding, and hysteria also played a role in the increasing level 
and volatility of food prices, as did the flow of speculative capital 
from financial investors into agricultural commodity markets. As 
a result, a price spike greater than what is explainable by funda-
mentals occurred during the first six months of 2008 (Figure 1).
The flow of speculative capital from financial investors into 
agricultural commodity markets was significant. From May 2007 
to May 2008, the volume of globally traded grain futures and 
options increased substantially (Table 1). Another indicator of 
speculative activity—the ratio of the monthly volume of futures 
trading to open interest—also increased substantially. 
Open interest describes the total number of futures con-
tracts of a given commodity that have not yet been offset 
by an opposite futures contract or fulfilled by delivery 
of the commodity. A speculator taking opposite posi-
tions in the market within days or weeks will generate an 
increase in monthly registered volumes but little change 
in monthly open interest. Therefore, changes in this ratio 
should capture changes in speculative activity. In 2008, 
soybean and rice ratios of futures to open interest were 
increasing at 27 percent and 19 percent, respectively, as 
wheat ratios continued to grow at 19 percent and maize 
ratios declined slightly. In contrast, in 2005 and 2006 at 
least three commodities’ ratios were declining on average.
Several statistical tests were conducted to determine 
the role of speculative activity in pushing up commod-
ity prices. The results suggest that speculation might have 
been influential (see box on page 2 entitled “On Specula-
tion” and the IFPRI issue brief When Speculation Matters, 













































Source: FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations), 
International commodity prices database, http://www.fao.org/es/esc/prices/
PricesServlet.jsp?lang=en, accessed 2008.by Miguel Robles, Maximo Torero, and Joachim von Braun. Wash-
ington, DC: International Food Policy Research Institute, 2009). 
Appropriate global institutional arrangements for preventing this 
kind of market failure are needed.
The Proposed New Institutional Design
To cope with the market failures revealed by the food price crisis, 
there are two traditional options. The first is to build up a signifi-
cant physical, public, globally managed grain reserve. In a global-
ized world, however, the scale of reserves required under this 
option would make storage costs excessive. A physical reserve is 
thus not appropriate as a major global initiative, but only as a 
minor one to address the need for smooth emergency operations. 
One way to minimize storage costs could be an internationally 
coordinated arrangement for shared reserves stored at the coun-
try level, as proposed by World Bank chief economist Justin Lin. 
Such an institutional design could be appropriate for the small 
physical emergency reserve proposed here.
The second option is to change the regulation of commodity 
exchanges to limit the volume of speculation versus hedging, 
to make delivery on contracts or portions of contracts compul-
sory, and to impose capital deposit requirements when each 
futures transaction is made. Difficulties could arise, however, in 
walking a line between ineffective regulations and overzealous 
ones. Market regulation also raises political economy concerns: 
regulatory measures could benefit relatively small groups, certain 
groups may capture control of the regulatory agency, regulatory 
agreements may not be completed, and countries may lack the 
institutional capacity to implement and enforce the regulatory 
measures. Although some improvement in regulation is called 
for, regulating commodity exchanges in harmony across the 
globe appears too complex a collective action problem given very 
different country circumstances.
The two global collective actions we propose—a small, in-
dependent physical emergency reserve and a virtual reserve and 
intervention mechanism backed up by a financial fund—would 
avoid these problems while ensuring that the world can respond 
to emergency needs for food and prevent extreme price spikes.
The independent emergency reserve. A modest emer-
gency reserve of around 300,000–500,000 metric tons of basic 
grains—about 5 percent of the current food aid flows of 6.7 
million wheat-equivalent metric tons—would be supplied by 
the main grain-producing countries and funded by a group of 
countries participating in the scheme. These countries would 
include the Group of Eight Plus Five (G8+5) countries (Canada, 
France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the United Kingdom, the 
United States, Brazil, China, India, Mexico, and South Africa) 
and perhaps others. This decentralized reserve would be located 
at strategic points near or in major developing-country regions, 
using existing national storage facilities. The reserve, to be used 
exclusively for emergency response and humanitarian assistance, 
would be managed by the World Food Programme (WFP). The 
WFP would have access to the grain at pre-crisis market prices 
to reduce the need for short-term ad hoc fundraising. To cover 
the cost of restoring the reserve to its initial level (that is, the 
difference between the post-crisis price and the pre-crisis price 
times the quantity of reserves used by WFP), an emergency fund 
should be created and its level maintained by the participat-
ing countries. The fund should be accompanied by a financing 
facility that the WFP could draw upon as needed to cope with 
potentially increased transport costs, as experienced in the 2008 
crisis. This arrangement could also be defined under a newly 
designed Food Aid Convention.
The virtual reserve. The virtual reserve and intervention 
mechanism would have four major components (see Figure 2).
1. The Club. The virtual reserve would be implemented as a co-
ordinated commitment by the member countries of the Club, 
which may consist, for instance, of the G8+5 plus some 
other major grain-exporting countries (such as Argentina, 
Thailand, and Vietnam). Each country would commit to sup-
plying funds, if needed, for intervention in the futures mar-
ket. Agreement on the arrangements for the Club will not 
be easy and may require a high-level United Nations task 
force to analyze the way forward. Yet similar institutional 
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  Growth in traded volume (%)
Commodity  Futures  Options
Maize    0  13
Soybeans  40  69
Soybean oil  46  69
Wheat  17  45
Rough rice  48  41
Source: Chicago Board of Trade 2008.
Table 1— Growth in the volume of globally traded grain 
futures and options, May 2007–May 2008
On Speculation
Our analysis tested to what extent a series of indicators 
for speculative activity can help forecast spot price 
movements. The Granger causality test—which 
determines whether past movements in one variable 
can help explain current movements in another one—
was applied to each agricultural commodity. The results 
show that the ratio of monthly volume to open interest 
and the ratio of noncommercial long positions to total 
long positions in futures contracts has an influence in 
forecasting price movements for wheat and rice. When 
the same ratio for short positions was analyzed, there 
was additional evidence that speculation affects prices, 
with significant results in maize and soybean markets. 
There is evidence, therefore, that speculative activity 
partly explains the price spike since January 2008 (see 
the IFPRI issue brief When Speculation Matters, www.
ifpri.org/pubs/ib/ib57.asp).arrangements have been made in the past; examples are 
the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) 
and the Food Aid Convention (FAC). IFAD was established 
as an international financial institution in 1977 as a major 
outcome of the 1974 World Food Conference in response to 
the food crises of the early 1970s. The FAC, first signed in 
1967 and renewed five times, is the only treaty under which 
signatories have a legal obligation to provide international 
development assistance.
2. The fund. The fund would normally consist not of actual bud-
get expenditures, but of promissory, or virtual, financing by 
the Club. The fund would be drawn upon by the high-level 
technical commission only when needed for intervention in 
the futures market (much previous evidence has shown a link 
between futures and spot markets—see citations at http://
www.ifpri.org/pubs/bp/bp010reading.pdf). Preliminary esti-
mates show that for the virtual reserve to be a credible signal, 
the fund should be US$12–20 billion. A fund of this size might 
cover 30 to 50 percent of normal grain trade volume. Deter-
mining the exact size of this fund will require further analysis, 
however, because commodity futures markets allow for high 
levels of leverage.
3. The global intelligence unit. The global intelligence unit, to 
be established by the Club on a permanent basis, would have 
three main roles:
•	 Forecasting prices in the medium and long run. The unit 
will forecast prices by combining an assessment of the 
fundamentals component (supply and demand factors) 
with a medium-term to long-term financial model in 
which the spot price of a commodity at a certain time 
is decomposed into stochastic factors. The unit would 
pay special attention to key indicators of how well com-
modity exchanges are functioning, such as divergences 
between spot prices and futures prices. Using models that 
capture fundamental forces in price determination as well 
as stochastic factors, the unit will incorporate the im-
pacts of market intervention policies.
•	 Designing and maintaining a dynamic price band system. 
The unit would design a fairly widely defined price band 
based on the forecasting model.
•	 Triggering interventions. The unit would trigger the alarm 
to the high-level technical commission that prices are 
significantly outside their estimated price band (that is, 
prices are approaching a spike) based on the dynamic 
price band system. The high-level technical commission 
would then decide whether to approve sales in the futures 
markets until a speculative attack is largely eliminated. 
The recommendation of the intelligence unit would in-
clude the price at which sales of futures should be made 
and the duration and frequency of the operations.
  The intelligence unit would be part of an existing multilat-
eral institution with a small team of full-time staff. Ideally, 
the intelligence unit could be built within an institution that 
already has the long- and medium-term modeling infra-
structure for price forecasting. It would also draw on exist-
ing analytical capacity in specialized organizations (such 
as FAO, the U.S. Department of Agriculture, IFPRI, and the 
World Grain Council).
4. The high-level technical commission. The high-level techni-
cal commission, which would be appointed by the Club on a 
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Figure 2—Institutional design behind the virtual reserve
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permanent basis, would make the official decision to inter-
vene in the futures market once the triggers are activated 
by the intelligence unit. This commission will need to have 
full autonomy.
How the Intervention Mechanism Will Operate
The intervention mechanism will be two-pronged. First, and per-
haps most important, the global intelligence unit will announce 
price forecasts and specify the price band. This announcement will 
be a signal—or a threat—to speculators that intervention is likely 
if futures prices exceed the defined upper limit of the price band. 
Moreover, the announcement will specify a confidence interval for 
the upper limit to increase the risk for potential speculators.
Second, if, despite the signal, there is evidence of an emerg-
ing price spike, the global intelligence unit will alert the high-
level technical commission that prices are significantly above 
their estimated dynamic price band based on market fundamen-
tals. The autonomous technical commission will then decide 
whether to intervene in the futures market. This intervention 
would consist of executing a number of progressive short sales 
(that is, selling a firm promise—a futures contract—to deliver the 
commodity at a later date at the specified price) over a specific 
period of time in futures markets at market prices at a variety 
of different future positions until futures prices and spot prices 
decline to levels within the estimated price bands. The global 
intelligence unit would recommend the price or series of prices 
to be offered in the short sales.
This increase in the supply of short sales will reduce spot 
prices and should make speculators move out of the market—in 
other words, a backwardation will be created (the situation 
in which, and the amount by which, the price of a commodity 
for future delivery is lower  than the spot price or a far future 
delivery price is lower   than a nearer future delivery price). Mov-
ing speculators out of the market will minimize the potential 
second-round effects of this intervention given that spot prices 
will return to being consistent with fundamentals, and therefore 
the lower spot prices should not result in the accelerated use of 
available supplies.
All futures contracts are ultimately settled either through 
liquidation by offsetting purchases or sales (the vast majority of 
agricultural futures contracts are settled this way) or through 
delivery of the actual physical commodity. The virtual fund will 
thus come into play only if there is a need to realize the futures 
sales, in which case the fund will be used to obtain the necessary 
grain supply to comply and calm the markets. Usually, this action 
would not be necessary and the whole operation would stay vir-
tual. Questions will remain about the price, the amount of short 
sales, and the duration of the intervention in the futures mar-
kets, and answering them will require political consultation and 
continuous monitoring and research. If the system governing the 
virtual reserve is established by large grain-exporting countries, 
there would be no temptation to aim for particularly low food 
prices that would undermine producers’ incentives.
The innovative concept behind the virtual reserve is the 
signal that it gives to markets, including speculators. Its presence 
alone is likely to divert speculators from entering this market. 
Nonetheless, the commission must be ready to trade grain when 
necessary and to assume the costs if in the future it must buy 
back contracts at a higher price than it sold them for.
The global intelligence unit has an important and challeng-
ing role in price forecasting. To be a credible basis for market 
intervention, price forecasts must contain some new knowledge, 
widely regarded as credible when released, that is not already 
reflected in the structure of market prices. This new knowledge 
consists of the combination of the fundamentals component 
(that is, supply and demand factors) and a medium- to long-term 
financial model that captures stochastic factors.
The physical and virtual reserve system should be continu-
ously monitored and evaluated for effectiveness. A comprehensive 
cost-benefit assessment of the system must go beyond agricul-
tural markets to include food security and poverty considerations.
Final Considerations
The major goal of the proposed virtual reserve is to establish a 
mechanism that will, through market transactions, minimize 
any speculative attack on food commodity markets to avoid 
price spikes in the future. It would not interfere with market 
fundamentals, but rather enhance long-term efficient supply 
response and investment in agriculture. A virtual reserve system 
would also help prevent the kinds of harmful ad hoc trade policy 
interventions, such as export bans, high export tariffs, and high 
import subsidies, that have been both a cause and an effect of 
the recent price crisis.
Neither the poor nor governments can afford excessive specu-
lation in food markets. There is clearly a need for global collective 
action to facilitate well-functioning grain markets. The virtual 
reserve concept is a viable innovative option that could prevent 
speculators from unduly affecting this basic food market, which is 
so central for the livelihoods of the poorest 2 billion people.
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